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sophisticated thinker of today from taking these cases at their face-value is the fear of being thought unscientific; whereas, if our argument is correct, science has nothing to say against them.

But in any case, interaction between conscious process and bodily process would seem to be more credible than a parallelism with its closed circle of physical energy. While of course the normal equality between income and outgo might be due to the conservation of that energy alone, it might also be due to the action of natural selection, destroying in the end a kind of life that did not by interaction keep the balance even. The facts established by the experiments before us give no ground for preferring the one explanation to the other; and accordingly the view natural to experience and common sense, the view of interaction, seems the more reasonable. The philosopher and psychologist, overawed by what they hastily assumed to be a dictum of science, seem to have renounced what science had not asked them to give up, and fled when no foe pursued.

Finally, we repeat that is not a question of finding some device by which mind may influence a nerve-current without doing work—as by a switch or a releasing of potential energy. We need not content ourselves with so feeble a prerogative; the experiments have shown no reason why mind may not do a great deal of physical work. Normally, to be sure, the amount of that work would be such as to keep the equilibrium between inflow and output of energy; but in exceptional cases mind might send forth an amount which would far exceed the volume taken in through the usual physical channels.

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## INSTINCT AND CAPACITY—II

### HOMO DOMESTICUS

MAN has been dignified by science with the title *Homo sapiens*; but his wisdom is the wisdom of his traditions. To the anatomist the cerebrum looms large; to the anthropologist—institutions.

History “records the transfer of power from one mystically sanctified source of authority to another, from a church to a book, from a book to a state, or to an intangible public opinion. But with unfailing tenacity every society from the simplest to the most complex has adhered to the principle that the one unpardonable sin consists in setting up one’s private judgment against the recognized tribal authority, in perpetrating an infraction of tribal taboos.”<sup>1</sup> If the name of the species were based on its behavior man would be called *Homo domesticus*.

<sup>1</sup> Lowie, *Primitive Society*, p. 440.

The significant fact of human anatomy, indeed, is not the brain but the unique generalization of the whole structure—a generalization of which the highly developed brain is but one element. To be sure, this has been overlooked almost completely by scientists who are not interested in behavior, even though they have recognized the human species as unspecialized. The British anatomist, Wood Jones, however, has made it abundantly evident that structural generalization is the reverse side of functional generalization. Functionally, man is conspicuously free of instinct compulsions to particular set acts. Biological scientists generally class his behavior as non-instinctive. And according to Wood Jones the similarly conspicuous absence of highly specialized structures from the human make-up is the anatomical statement of the same fact of human adaptability and docility. He has even hazarded a generalization: the “law of successful minimal adaptive specialization.” This means that “a complete, early, and all-absorbing specialization is almost synonymous with specific senility.” “It is the distinction of the human stock that it never became the slave of its arboreal environment for it became adapted to tree life in a strictly tempered manner, and it specialized to the successful minimum degree.”<sup>2</sup>

*Homo sapiens* is a creature whose sense impressions are not confined to his nose; whose forelegs and paws are specialized neither to clinging nor swimming nor digging nor flying—nor even to walking. Similarly on the functional side he is equally responsive to an incalculable variety of stimuli instead of reacting to a particular and narrow range of perceptions with typical and invariable behavior. He has cut loose from all dietary dogmas,<sup>3</sup> and has avoided all fatal facilities.<sup>4</sup> He is an arboreal post-graduate, with a sound phylogenetic education.

And the process has left him correspondingly docile. This is the important fact for students of behavior. Obviously man like

<sup>2</sup> *Arboreal Man*, pp. 212 and 214. Of course the author does not claim any particular originality for this theory in its general form. It has been quite variously held. Watson, for instance, makes the remark, “Instinct and capacity to form habits, while related functions, are present in any animal in inverse ratio.” *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist*, p. 254.

<sup>3</sup> “The educational possibilities that the arboreal habit offers to a sloth are extremely limited; even the range of its diet becomes restricted, and an animal that has become an arboreal clinger is an animal entering upon specific senility.” *Arboreal Man*, p. 215.

<sup>4</sup> Their fore-limbs (flying mammals) have become purely specialized as wings; they are no longer useful for grasping, for touch, for examination and for all the other functions which we have seen are so essential to the final education of the neopallium which makes for real evolutionary progress. *Ibid.*, p. 220.

any other creature is a compound of an indefinite number of special traits and characters, each one important enough in its own field. But around and about and above them all is the net effect of them all together: unique freedom from special (and therefore limiting) propensities—in a word, his docility.

Man has lived in every climate; he has eaten everything; he has gone off by himself in splendid isolation, and he has packed himself layer above layer into the congeries of city life; he has got along with sticks and stones, and he has altered the whole face of the earth. The attempt to enumerate his activities is hopeless; but the matter can be got at in another way.

No records have ever revealed a time when the different races and classes of men have not looked on each other's ways of life with incomprehension, wonder and disgust. To others, the life of the serf is one of squalid and malodorous futility. At the other extreme in the most rarefied atmosphere of social elevation men are encompassed by an elegant and decorative, though scarcely less pointless and sordid, futility. Between the two there is the life of assiduous calculation of the means to the end of further calculation of the means. So, in each case, it seems to the others. Civilizations stand at the cross-roads and scrutinize each other, and ask themselves that stock question of all vernaculars: "How do they do it?"

And the only adequate answer is the biological fact that man is the meekest of the domestic animals. His congenital susceptibility to domestication is stronger than that of any other barnyard creature. It is so strong that of all the species known to anatomy this one alone has never been captured in the wild state. However far down you dig he always turns up with a fancy funereal pose and a barrow-full of flints. A wild-man is a contradiction in terms.

At once a caution must be sounded against the notion that this means that man is the only species that carries on complex community activities. Of course many species, particularly insects, do that. But there is no scrap of evidence to indicate that the individuals of those species are house-broken in infancy to the systems of domestication which are to be theirs. That process—the process of domestication—is the unique distinction of man. Not only has the generalization of the human structure left man peculiarly adaptable; it has left him almost wholly without the means of carrying on except by the development of behavior complexes which he receives through domestication. He is like a person who has developed a high degree of tolerance to a poison, say cocaine: not only can

he take it in stupendous quantities; but he can not live without it. In his economy there are two indispensable elements—himself, and the drug.

Similarly, in human behavior there are two main elements: the species and its cultures. A professor, perhaps, should call this the law of tolerance to domestication. To speak of the "normal" behavior of man, as one would speak of the normal behavior of even orang-outangs, is ridiculous. The dictionary compresses the characteristic activity of the orang into four lines; what, could it say, are the normal acts of man? There is a normal structure, characteristic of the species, unaffected to any great degree by domestication. Normal behavior must needs be just what normal structure is—a species uniformity. But the only normal behavior of *Homo sapiens* is domestication; beyond that every act depends on the culture. Human behavior is the behavior of institutions.

In one further respect, perhaps, the behavior of man is as uniform and invariable and generally characteristic of a species as his culture-tolerance, to wit, his contempt and loathing for other systems of domestication than his own. Possibly this is the same law of tolerance to domestication stated in negatives as the law of alter-cultural intolerance.

Everyone recognizes as a matter of course that a scheme of behavior is necessarily a scheme of rigid taboo. The traditions of others are necessarily wrong. Intolerance is the essence of every strong tradition. And this means not mere emotional disaffection, but physiological intolerance—incapacity to assimilate the foreign material without great pain and the risk of total collapse. In infancy the vocal organs of every structurally normal human child can compass the whole range of vowels and consonants of all the jargons of Babel. An infant forms sounds which have become totally impossible for his parents through long habituation to the narrow range of modulations of one articulate language. As its palate is gradually trained to the intonations of its tradition it not only finds those sounds becoming increasingly "natural," but all others increasingly awkward, and in the end impossible. The same is true of those things which have the most awful significance—the highest reaches of religion and morality. Every religion has its heathen, and every rule of life its unrighteous. Civilization is the determination of behavior by prescription and taboo.

And the taboo pertains not so much to the exercise of judgment as to the existence of infidelism. Civilization is not primarily a conspiracy against intelligence; in each manifestation it is a necessarily exclusive mode of behavior. "The folkways are the 'right' ways

to satisfy all interests, because they are traditional, and exist in fact. . . . The right way is the way which the ancestors used and which has been handed down. The tradition is its own warrant. . . . When we come to the folkways we are at the end of our analysis." The child is meek; but he is also errant. The folkways make a man of him.

It is only to summarize these obvious and, I should think, universally admitted facts that I have used the somewhat academic generalization: the law of tolerance to domestication and its corollary of alter-cultural intolerance. The words are unimportant, but it seems quite unescapable (1) that the human species is not wild; (2) that in each of its many domestic states its behavior is guided by a system of traditions which have been assumed as easily as clothes by an essentially unspecialized creature with a natural aptitude for learning; (3) that the domesticating process does away with the immature tolerance of its subjects, leaving them culture-bound just as other species are structure-bound and instinct-bound. Such a description seems to be demanded by the facts; it neither falls short of the facts nor exceeds them.

So much for the facts. There remains the problem of justifying invidious distinctions. After all a scientific theory must not only state the truth but accomplish some laudable practical purpose. And the most laudable purpose, in the case of the sciences that deal with human affairs, is generally taken to be the preservation of those things which seem sacred and profitable to the preservers. Consequently a great deal of the best anthropological scholarship has found its *sine qua non* in the special incapacities of sex and class and race which recommend themselves to the prejudices of well-domesticated Europeans. Women lack the faculty of ratiocination; the lower orders that of enterprise. Hindus have an incapacity for work; Chinese for change; Africans for anything "above the level of a child"; and the dolicho-blond has his famous incapacity for war and predation which has set him at the forefront of a practical world with the white man's burden on his shoulders. The intention of such hypotheses is to account not only for the fact of cultural differentiation, but for the mating of each people with its culture—and for the superiority of the superior.

At first glance it seems remarkably simple and obvious to equate cultural and phylogenetic peculiarities. But the argument is handicapped by the notorious failure of the slight anatomical differences between the races to sustain any theory of behavior-limitation. However, the facts of anatomy are usually circumvented by the following device.

1. Assume that the special capacities (incapacities) of race strains are deducible from their behavior in their native cultural habitats.

2. Observe that there are wide differences between the capacities (behavior) of the different strains: this proves that the races differ in hereditary "capacity for civilization."

3. Observe the distribution over the earth of the peoples whose various capacities have just been demonstrated: it will be found that low capacity is associated with low culture and high capacity with high culture.

4. It follows that racial incapacities are the cause of culture-limitations, each culture representing the full development of its race.<sup>5</sup>

In the remarkably restrained chapter on race in his *Anthropology* Marett writes: "Mere prejudices, bad as they are, are hardly worse guides to action than premature exploitations of science." He might have added that to *Petitio Principii* all things are possible.

The argument for special limitations seems of no particular value, however, not so much on account of its luxuriance of logic, as because it is not needed. The principle of economy of hypothesis stands against it. The intolerance of Africans and Asiatics to European civilization and the reverse intolerance of Europeans to "heathendom" are all perfectly explicable on the basis of the acknowledged facts and the obvious inference of alter-cultural intolerance. Furthermore—and of far greater weight—the culture theory of behavior is an incomparably more fertile source of principles affecting the whole field of behavior. If it can once be recognized clearly that the content of behavior is a culture content and not an instinct content, it will be possible to make rapid progress in the development of such categories as may be necessary for the analysis of the genesis and evolution of cultural behavior-systems.

Indeed, beginnings already exist. For instance, there is the cross-fertilization theory of cultural evolution. "Cultures develop mainly through the borrowings due to chance contact. Our own civilization is even more largely than the rest a complex of borrowed traits."<sup>6</sup> It may seem a bit paradoxical at first to say that

<sup>5</sup> No reader will need a citation for this argument. Perhaps its most recent employment is in McDougall's *Is America Safe for Democracy?*

<sup>6</sup> Lowie: *Primitive Society*, p. 441. If I had written this I would have said: ". . . even more obviously than the rest. . . ." In *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution* Veblen has made a detailed case study of this phenomenon. See especially Chapter II, "On the Merits of Borrowing."

cultures develop by taking in each other's washing; but call it by a biological name and you have a strict analogy to the process by which a variety of individuals are produced through a hybridized heredity. It is not unreasonable to expect from this principle the growth of a science of culture-genetics.

And lest the theory of cultures become hyper-individualized, the social multiverse idea will need to be dispelled—or psycho-analyzed away. On the basis of Cooley's truism that "a separate individual is an abstraction unknown to experience,"<sup>7</sup> which seems commonplace until you study it a bit, some hypotheses may be built of the identity between the linking of traditions in a culture and the development of behavior-complexes in an individual. After all, a "complex" is only a system of cultural influences provoked into action by a culturally appropriate social situation. The analysis of character is the analysis of culture-complexes.

It may even appear in the end that *Homo sapiens* meant *Homo domesticus*.

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### THE GROUP SPIRIT AND THE FEAR OF THE DEAD

THOUGHT, like all history, frequently appears to repeat itself. Sir Thomas Browne began his essay on "Dreams" by writing: "The day supplieth us with truths, the night with pictures and falsehoods, which uncomfortably divide the natural account of our beings"; Owen Feltham, a contemporary of Browne's, began his essay on "Dreams" by writing: "Dreams are very notable means of discovering our own inclinations" and he added that the naked and natural thoughts of our minds visit us during sleep. Feltham's view has returned, with a vigorous swing, into favor. A dominant estimate of the dream supposes the "pictures and falsehoods" to be disguised versions of "our own inclinations" and the "natural thoughts of our souls" to appear in dreaming, though their nakedness may be covered by a cloak of symbolism. The modern Freudian interpretation of dreaming is not, of course, a mere repetition of Feltham: it is elaboration of a hint. Thought often seems to return upon itself, to veer backwards, when it is accepting a hint from the past. One aspect of the history of thought consists in the elaboration, during one epoch, of ideas which had been realized before but left incompletely developed as hints for future generations.

The shepherd Gyges discovered a magic ring which, when

<sup>7</sup> *Human Nature and the Social Order*, p. 1.